SEX OFFENSES AND DUE PROCESS: WHEN PUBLIC OPINION
CONTRADICTS SCIENTIFIC CONSENSUS

Matthew Jerrehian*
“[N]or can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference
concerning real existence and matter of fact.”
—David Hume
1

In 2019, Tennessee passed a statute forbidding certain sexual offenders
from residing with—or being alone with—their own children.2 The same year,
the North Carolina Supreme Court struck down a statute imposing lifetime
ankle monitoring on sex offenders.3 On January 22, 2020, the New York
Assembly began considering a bill that would allow the Metropolitan
Transportation Authority to ban sex offenders from public transportation.4 All
of this aggressive legislation has arisen despite a scientific consensus that it does
not protect the public and sometimes even increases recidivism rates.5
The abduction of eleven-year-old Jacob Wetterling in 1989 triggered a
nationwide pursuit of policies that would prevent crimes against children, and
legislatures settled on monitoring and restricting the actions of people
previously convicted of sexual offenses.6 Wetterling was abducted by a person
previously convicted of a sexual offense, and the United States Congress
responded by requiring each state to create a registry system.7 These
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restrictions have become increasingly severe over time8: legislatures have
banned convicted offenders from living in certain places,9 forbidden them
from using social media,10 and even required them to wear ankle monitors for
the rest of their lives.11 While some such restrictions have been struck down
as violating the United States Constitution or a state constitution, many
remain.12 Studies have repeatedly shown that these laws are ineffective or
counterproductive at preventing recidivism, but courts and legislatures have
been unresponsive to the science.13
The issue is not only whether legislatures are free to regulate sex offenders
in this way but also whether they are free to enact regulations under the pretext
of public safety no matter what their actual effect is on the public. Courts
should not defer to legislative determinations when they are clearly contrary
to the data. If legislatures were free to ban former sex offenders from living in
a city despite an abundance of evidence that such a ban harms public safety,14
they would also have the power to ban people who have been convicted of any
crime, people with unpaid parking tickets, or even everyone who has read
Lolita.
This Comment argues that the due process clause of the Constitution of
the United States and parallel clauses of state constitutions require courts to
examine the scientific evidence undermining sex offender statutes. After
explaining the mistake courts make by refusing to consider the evidence, I
examine the due process constraints that courts should find apply to these
statutes. The form of that requirement depends on the structure of the statute.
If it applies only to dangerous offenders, there is a procedural due process
right to present evidence of non-dangerousness. If it applies to all people
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convicted of certain offenses, I argue that it violates substantive due process
because empirical evidence shows that the statute has no rational basis.
Part I of this Comment discusses the sex offender statutes in place and the
scientific evidence for and against their effectiveness. Part II explains the
logical error that courts make by premising their reasoning on empirical claims
while relying on deductive reasoning to make those claims. Part III reviews
the precedent for incorporating sex offender data into court decisions in other
areas of law. Part IV argues that sex offender statutes that ignore these data
violate due process. They violate procedural due process when they purport
to restrict only dangerous offenders but provide no mechanism for offenders
to show that they are not dangerous. They violate substantive due process
when they apply to all offenders, including those who pose no risk of
recidivism. Finally, these statutes violate the due process prohibition on
irrebuttable presumptions in jurisdictions that follow that doctrine because
they presume that all people convicted of a sex offense will reoffend and offer
no opportunity to rebut that presumption. As part of the due process analysis,
courts have a duty to examine the available empirical data, and these
constitutional provisions require courts to fulfill that duty.
I. THE STATUTES AND THE RESEARCH
Sex offender statutes have developed in three major acts. The 1994
Wetterling Act established the registry system that required those convicted of
certain sexual offenses to register their address information with local
authorities, who were allowed to publicize it.15 Congress ensured state
compliance with this Act by conditioning federal funds on its
implementation.16 Second, Congress passed Megan’s Law in 1996, which
made the release of registry information mandatory when “necessary to
protect the public.”17 Third, the Adam Walsh Act,18 passed in 2006, made
many significant changes, including that the registration requirements would
depend solely on the conviction offense, rather than on a judicial assessment
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of the individual defendant’s danger to the public.19 In addition to the federal
statutes requiring that states maintain registry systems, state statutes also create
collateral consequences of a sex offense conviction, including residency
restrictions, GPS monitoring, bans on internet use, and employment
restrictions.20 Some states have even banned people convicted of sex offenses
from being present in public places such as parks21 and libraries.22
All these restrictions also harm the offenders outside of what the restriction
itself requires, from interfering with employment prospects to causing
homelessness. New York, for example, enacted a ban for some offenders on
living within one thousand feet of a school,23 which rendered it virtually
impossible to find housing in New York City, where schools are common and
the population is dense.24 As a result, many released offenders in New York
City are homeless but are denied access to shelters—most of which are within
one thousand feet of a school—and the state instead houses them in prisons.25
In McKune v. Lile, the Supreme Court upheld a state sex offender law,
finding it justified because sex offenders have “a frightening and high risk of
recidivism.”26 The Court gave no citation for that claim but did provide
support earlier in the opinion,27 citing a Bureau of Justice Statistics report that
addressed recidivism.28 Since the McKune decision, however, there has been
a scientific consensus that the recidivism rate is low and that these laws are
ineffective.29
First, contrary to the McKune Court’s claim, sex offenders are unlikely to
commit a new sexual offense. The reports cited in McKune found that
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released rapists were 10.5 times as likely as non-rapists to be rearrested for
rape while those released after a sexual assault conviction were 7.5 times as
likely to be rearrested for sexual assault.30 It is notable that these reports
measured rearrest rates, not conviction rates, so the numbers are inflated.
Since the publication of those reports, other studies have shown that the
recidivism rate for people with prior sex offense convictions is lower than that
for people with other convictions.31 Studies show that only 0.08-1.05% of
former sexual offenders commit a new sexual offense within three years,32 and
they are less likely to recidivate after that.33
Second, even if sex offenders were likely to recidivate, the laws restricting
them do not lower the chances of recidivism and may even raise them. The
registry system has been found to have either no impact on recidivism or to
increase it.34 Residency restrictions remove offenders from their communities,
alienate them, prevent them from accessing treatment, and increase the risk
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that they will recidivate.35 A ban on internet use also interferes with a former
offender’s ability to find a job and increases the chances of recidivism.36 The
actual results of these laws are entirely contrary to their ostensible purpose.
Previous scholarship has framed the preponderance of ineffective laws as
a policy failure, but I argue that it is also a failure of the courts. These statutes
are not simply unwise: they are also unconstitutional.
II. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ERROR: DEDUCTIVE REASONING AND
QUESTIONS OF FACT
The failure of courts to examine the data stems from their failure to
recognize that deduction and induction are two distinct forms of reasoning
which deliver two distinct forms of knowledge. Deduction begins with
premises and draws necessary conclusions, while induction begins with
evidence and determines what it tends to show.37 Courts have mistakenly
attempted to deduce facts about the external world: that sex offenders have a
high recidivism rate, that treatment is not possible, and that regulations such
as residency restrictions will reduce recidivism. These claims require data to
support them.
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The distinction between deductive and inductive reasoning is centuries
old. John Locke argued in 1689, “The knowledge of the existence of
any . . . thing, we can have only by sensation.”38 Sensation, which provides
experiential data, is the only way to obtain knowledge of the world. David
Hume also drew this distinction in his work published in 1777: “All reasonings
may be divided into two kinds, namely demonstrative reasoning, or that
concerning relations of ideas, and moral reasoning, or that concerning matter
of fact and existence.”39 These are distinct forms of reasoning that deliver
distinct forms of knowledge. “[O]ur reason, unassisted by experience, [can
never] draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact.”40 Only
experience, or data acquired through observation, can deliver answers about
the external world. One cannot use deductive reasoning to answer empirical
questions. A judge cannot deduce from the idea of a sex offender that
recidivism rates are high. That is an empirical question, which requires data
to answer.
Judges, however, frequently resist incorporating empirical data into their
decisions. The Supreme Court of the United States repeated a common
explanation in McCleskey v. Kemp: “Legislatures also are better qualified to
weigh and ‘evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their own local
conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is not available to the
courts.’”41 Courts sometimes think of themselves as using pure deductive
reasoning, while legislatures work with statistics and studies.42 If a legislature
finds that requiring sex offenders to register will reduce recidivism, courts must
defer to that determination.43
Although judges prefer not to use inductive reasoning here, many
decisions involving sex offender regulations make claims of fact, which can
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only be evaluated through such reasoning.44 Beginning with McKune, courts
have made explicit claims about the recidivism rate of sex offenders: they have
not deferred to legislative findings on what the recidivism rate is but
incorporated empirical claims into their reasoning.45 The claim that the risk
of recidivism is “frightening and high” has been quoted and repeated by courts
since then.46 Some courts citing the McKune language take it as binding
precedent that the recidivism rate is high, rather than using new studies to
determine what the recidivism rate is. For example, the Supreme Court of
California in 2015 cited Smith v. Doe to support the claim that sex offenders
pose a high recidivism risk rather than examining studies published since that
decision.47 Other courts use common sense—rather than the available
evidence—to support claims about sex offenders.48 The result is that courts
make empirical claims but use no empirical work.
Empirical data on recidivism rates and the effects of existing regulations
are available,49 yet courts rarely consider these data. In citing the Bureau of
Justice Statistics report, the McKune Court did not establish a binding
precedent that it is a fact that sex offenders have a high recidivism rate. Rather,
the Court cited an empirical study, which gives lower courts permission to
examine other data that may undermine the Bureau of Justice Statistics
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report’s conclusion.50 Under McKune and Smith v. Doe, the use of data on
sex offender recidivism is not only permissible: it is required. Courts must
replace their reliance on precedential reasoning and reasoning from common
sense with inductive reasoning. When making claims about matters of fact,
courts must examine data acquired by experience rather than deduction.
III. BACKGROUND DECISIONS USING EMPIRICAL DATA IN THE SEX
OFFENDER CONTEXT
Despite courts’ failures to use the data in this context, there is a wealth of
precedent that courts may consider these empirical data on sex offender laws
and recidivism in contexts other than due process. Smith v. Doe and McKune
are not the only decisions that have cited empirical data. Courts have also
done so in determining whether the restriction is a punishment, whether it
violates the Fourth Amendment, and whether it violates state laws.
Courts have frequently performed the punishment analysis for sex
offender laws because legislatures often apply them retroactively, which the ex
post facto clause of the United States Constitution and parallel clauses in state
constitutions forbid for punishments. Two factors in that analysis are whether
there is a rational non-punitive purpose for the statute and whether the statute
is excessive in relation to that purpose.51 The year after McKune, the Supreme
Court relied on its language to conclude that an Alaska registration statute did
not impose punishment.52 It found the statute proportionate to the
nonpunitive purpose of public safety because “[t]he risk of recidivism posed
by sex offenders is ‘frightening and high.’”53 Since that time, however, many
courts have reexamined the scientific literature and determined that such
statutes are punishment because they are out of proportion to the small public
safety risk posed by sex offenders.
The Sixth Circuit, for example, relied on empirical studies and explicitly
expressed its skepticism of the Smith Court’s claim.54 It determined that a sex
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See Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 704 (6th Cir. 2016) (stating that empirical studies cast doubt
on the claim that there is a “frightening and high” risk of recidivism among sex offenders).

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

530

[Vol. 23:2

offender regulation was punishment and violated ex post facto laws because
abundant studies showed that regulations like the one in question did not
reduce recidivism and may actually increase it.55 Rather than relying on Smith
and McKune, the Sixth Circuit examined multiple studies that showed that
registration requirements did not reduce recidivism, and therefore had no
rational relation to a nonpunitive purpose.56 The Sixth Circuit provided a
model for how courts should interpret Smith and McKune: not as binding
precedent establishing that sex offenders have a high recidivism rate, but as a
precedent that requires courts to examine studies, just as those courts did.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of North Carolina found that an ankle
monitor requirement violated the Fourth Amendment because the defendant
had shown through empirical evidence that the recidivism rate for sex
offenders is low.57 To establish that the ankle monitoring, which was a Fourth
Amendment search,58 was a reasonable search “[t]he State has the burden of
coming forward with some evidence that its [Satellite-Based Monitoring]
program assists in apprehending sex offenders, deters or prevents new sex
offenses, or otherwise protects the public.”59 The court found that the search
was unreasonable because the evidence demonstrated that it was unnecessary.
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania struck down a county
ordinance that extended residency restrictions for sex offenders as violating
the State Parole and Sentencing Codes because the studies presented showed
that it contradicted the rehabilitative goals of those codes.60 Although the court
did not directly cite studies, it relied on empirical claims that were supported
by studies in the briefs: for example, the court wrote that the statute would
have the “unintended effect of threatening public safety, by depriving sex
offenders of access to resources which have been shown to reduce the risks of
recidivism,”61 which was supported by data presented in a brief.62
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Plaintiffs/Appellees at 16, Fross v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 438 F. App’x. 99 (3d. Cir. 2011) (No. 092036) (showing that such restrictions intensify “the psychosocial stressors that are linked to reoffense”).
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These decisions show that there is precedent for incorporating the
abundant empirical data on sex offender statutes into decisions on the validity
of those statutes. Courts should apply this same use of data to the due process
context.
IV. DUE PROCESS CONSTRAINTS
Statutes regulating sex offenders vary widely, and how a state chooses to
whom the restrictions apply determines whether procedural or substantive due
process requires a court to examine the evidence. Procedural due process
protects only those who are subjected to a statute that distinguishes between
offenders who pose a high risk of recidivism and those who do not. If a statute
seeks to impose restrictions on all those convicted of a certain offense, more
procedure will not help. But substantive due process protects those who are
subjected to statutes that have no rational basis. Legislatures cite public safety
as the state interest in these statutes, but the scientific consensus shows that the
means chosen by the legislatures are not rationally related to that end. Finally,
due process prohibits the use of irrebuttable presumptions that former sex
offenders are a danger to the public when they can show that they pose no
such danger. These three components of due process together can restrain
irrationally restrictive statutes.

A. Procedural Due Process
When a restriction applies only to offenders who are likely to recidivate,
due process requires that there be a procedure in which the offender may
present evidence of her recidivism risk. The procedural due process analysis
involves weighing the private interest and the risk of erroneous deprivation of
that interest against the cost to the government of additional procedures that
would lower the risk of erroneous deprivation.63 Courts that have struck down
sex offender statutes that apply to all those convicted of certain crimes for
procedural due process violations have mistakenly defined an erroneous
deprivation as imposing a regulation on someone who is unlikely to

63

See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976) (listing three factors to consider when determining
whether an individual has received due process under the Constitution).
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recidivate.64 As the legislature intended to deprive all convicted offenders of
these rights, the deprivation is not erroneous.65
The Supreme Court clarified this issue in Connecticut Department of Pub.
Safety v. Doe (“CDPS”), holding that a convicted sex offender has no right to
a determination that she is dangerous before she is required to register if the
state makes conviction the only prerequisite to registration.66 “[T]he law’s
requirements turn on an offender’s conviction alone,” the Court explained, “a
fact that a convicted offender has already had a procedurally safeguarded
opportunity to contest.”67 It would not be an error to require a non-dangerous
offender to register because the legislature intended all those convicted to
register, not only dangerous offenders.68 Furthermore, under the Adam
Walsh Act, the registration requirement is conditioned solely on the
conviction offense, which prevents any procedural due process challenge to
registration.69 The burden to the state of additional procedure outweighs the
defendant’s interest in additional procedure because the risk of erroneously
requiring someone who was not convicted of a sex offense to register as a sex
offender is virtually zero. Any statute that follows the Adam Walsh Act’s
model of classification based on offense complies with procedural due
process.
If, conversely, a statute does condition a sex offender regulation on the risk
the offender poses, that offender has a procedural due process right. In

64
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See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7 (2003) (“In short, even if respondent could
prove that he is not likely to be currently dangerous, Connecticut has decided that the registry
information of all sex offenders—currently dangerous or not—must be publicly disclosed.”).

66
67
68

Id.
Id.
See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 709 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Once such a legislative classification has been

69

drawn, additional procedures are unnecessary, because the statute does not provide a potential
exemption for individuals who seek to prove that they are not individually dangerous or likely to
offend against neighboring schoolchildren.”). But see United States v. Smedley, 611 F. Supp. 2d
971, 975 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (defining an erroneous deprivation as one that is not necessary to protect
the public).
See 34 U.S.C.A. § 20911 (West 2017) (defining three tiers of sex offender status according to the
underlying offense); 34 U.S.C. § 20915(a) (2018) (conditioning registration period on tier
classification). See also Elizabeth Reiner Platt, Gangsters to Greyhounds: The Past, Present, and
Future of Offender Registration, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 727, 771 (2013) (“[T]his issue
is now irrelevant in the case of sex offender registries in those states striving to comply with the AWA,
since the Act mandates the category-based approach discussed in CDP.”).
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Millard v. Rankin, for example, a Colorado statute violated procedural due
process because it instructed a court to determine whether a convicted sex
offender was likely to re-offend but denied the defendant an adequate
opportunity to be heard.70 The deficiency in the process was that the plaintiff’s
petition to be removed from the registry was denied without any “evident basis
to deny the petition.”71 When a legislature only imposes a sex offender
regulation on those with a high risk of recidivism, an offender has a right to be
exempted from the regulation if she can demonstrate that her risk level is low.72
Although there is no procedural due process right to a risk level
determination in general, there may be such a right if the state purports to only
restrict those who have a high risk of recidivism or if the state leaves the
restriction to the judge’s discretion.73

B. Substantive Due Process
The CDPS Court suggested “that respondent’s claim is actually a
substantive challenge to Connecticut’s statute ‘recast in “procedural due
process” terms,’” but it did not analyze the possible substantive due process
challenge.74 Substantive due process protects fundamental rights and liberty
interests from unreasonable government interference.75 If a state action
interferes with a fundamental right, it must be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.76 If the action does not implicate a fundamental right,
it need only have a rational relation to a legitimate government interest.77
Which of these two levels of scrutiny—strict scrutiny or rational basis—applies
depends on whether the private right asserted is “so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”78

70
71
72
73

74
75
76
77
78

Millard v. Rankin 265 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1232–33 (D. Colo. 2017).
Id. at 1233.

Id.
See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7 (2003) (suggesting that part of the reason for
upholding the Connecticut statute was that the state explicitly stated on the registry website that it had
not determined that registered individuals are currently dangerous).
Id. at 8 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 308 (1993)).
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
Id. at 721.
Id. at 728.
Id. at 721 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
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Although others have noted that there appears to be little hope for
substantive due process challenges to reign in sex offender restrictions,79 some
restrictions implicate fundamental rights and fail heightened scrutiny, and even
those that only trigger rational basis scrutiny fail when they plainly violate the
scientific consensus.

1. Some Sex Offender Restrictions Infringe on Fundamental Rights
While federal courts frequently determine that the standard established in
Washington v. Glucksberg80 makes it difficult to recognize a fundamental right
implicated by sex offender regulations,81 states recognize rights not recognized
in federal courts. State substantive due process provides an avenue to protect
these rights from the unnecessary imposition of sex offender restrictions.
Three important rights are frequently involved: the publication of registry
information implicates privacy and reputation rights, residency restrictions
implicate rights to live with one’s family, and restrictions on use of public
spaces implicate to right to travel freely within a state. In states that recognize

79

80

81

See, e.g., Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, supra note 6, 1123 (“For the sex offender, a
substantive due process claim is especially problematic.”); Elizabeth Reiner Platt, Gangsters to
Greyhounds: The Past, Present, and Future of Offender Registration, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 727, 772–73 (2013) (“With one narrow exception in the Third Circuit, federal appellate
courts have found that sex offender registries do not implicate any fundamental right. Thus, almost
all courts have determined the constitutionality of registries under the undemanding rational basis
review test. Sex offender registries have passed this test in every circuit in which this question has
been litigated, although some courts have expressed concerns that registries are overbroad.”).
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (“We must therefore ‘exercise the utmost care whenever
we are asked to break new ground in this field,’ lest the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause
be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the Members of this Court.”) (quoting Collins v.
City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) and Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
502 (1977)) (citations omitted).
Id. See also Doe v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 500 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he right
asserted here is not a fundamental right deeply rooted in our Nation’s history.”); Doe v. Moore, 410
F.3d 1337, 1345 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e can find no history or tradition that would elevate the issue
here to a fundamental right.”); Doe v. Tandeske, 361 F.3d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e are forced
to conclude that persons who have been convicted of serious sex offenses do not have a fundamental
right to be free from the registration and notification requirements set forth in the Alaska statute.”);
Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 643 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[A] fundamental right is not implicated . . .
.”); Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 405 (3rd Cir. 1999) (“Megan’s Law does not restrict plaintiffs’
freedom of action with respect to their families and therefore does not intrude upon the aspect of the
right to privacy . . . .”); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1094 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The collection and
dissemination of information under the Washington law does not violate any protected privacy
interest, and does not amount to a deprivation of liberty or property.”).
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these rights as fundamental, strict scrutiny applies under the state constitution’s
substantive due process provision.
First, whether the publication of an offender’s conviction information
infringes on her state privacy or reputation rights depends on whether a court
distinguishes between the publication of such information and normal public
availability of criminal conviction information. Since conviction information
is already publicly available, courts have generally found that compiling and
publishing it does not violate any right to privacy or reputation.82 When,
however, the registry publishes more information or presents it in a
distinguishable form, doing so may implicate fundamental rights. For
example, the Alaska Supreme Court recognized in Doe v. Department of
Public Safety that publishing the information online risked inflicting harms
“ranging from public scorn and ostracism to harassment, to difficulty in finding
and maintaining employment, to threats of violence and actual violence,” and
determined that such publication therefore implicated the offender’s privacy
rights.83 The Alaska Court relied on the United States Supreme Court’s
recognition that there is a distinction between records publicly available in a
courthouse’s physical files and those available online.84 Similarly, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts determined that “the aggregation and
dissemination of publicly available information has triggered a right to
privacy.”85 The most important factor in determining that this distribution of
information implicated privacy and reputation rights was that the statute
implicitly branded the plaintiff as a public danger.86 Publishing sex offender
registration information is not equivalent to keeping criminal records available
in physical files, and both state and federal courts should recognize these
injuries to privacy and reputation where such rights are protected.
82

83

84
85
86

See, e.g., Moore, 410 F.3d at 1345 (“[A] state’s publication of truthful information that is already
available to the public does not infringe the fundamental constitutional rights of liberty and privacy”);
People v. Cornelius, 821 N.E.2d 288, 303 (Ill. 2004) (finding that a sex offender registry statute does
not violate the defendant’s right to privacy because his information was already publicly available).
See also Nilson v. Layton City, 45 F.3d 369, 372 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Information readily available to
the public is not protected by the constitutional right to privacy.”).
Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 444 P.3d 116, 130 (Alaska 2019). See also Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367,
409 (N.J. 1995) (“The fact that plaintiff’s home address may be publicly available, therefore, does
not lead ineluctably to the conclusion that public disclosure of his address implicates no privacy
interest.”).
Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 444 P.3d at 129 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for
Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 764 (1989)).
Doe v. Att’y Gen., 686 N.E.2d 1007, 1012 (Mass. 1997).
Id. at 1013.
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Second, courts have been more reluctant to recognize that residency
restrictions infringe on the fundamental rights of the family relationship
because they do not see a close enough connection between a residency
restriction and the offender’s relation to her family. The Supreme Court has
generally recognized family relations to be protected by fundamental rights
that trigger strict scrutiny,87 and there is a fundamental right to live with one’s
family.88 Courts have not found, however, that restrictions on where that
residence can be directly infringe on that right.89 Neither state90 nor federal
courts91 have recognized a fundamental right to live in a particular place with
one’s family. Even when presented with the reality that an offender’s family
may not be able to afford to relocate in order to live together, courts have
found residency restrictions not to involve the right to live with family because
they do not absolutely bar doing so.92 Courts have not recognized that
residency restrictions implicate fundamental rights, and they do not apply strict
scrutiny.
Courts have not reached any clarity in a third area: whether a restriction
on a sex offender’s use of a public area implicates a fundamental right to travel
87
88
89

90
91

92

See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (“[T]he decision to marry is a fundamental
right . . . .”).
See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505–06 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he choice
of relatives in this degree of kinship to live together may not lightly be denied by the State.”).
See, e.g., People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (finding no fundamental right to
live with one’s family within 500 feet of a school); State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 663–64 (Iowa
2005) (“[A]n alleged infringement on a familial right is unconstitutional only when an infringement
has a direct and substantial impact on the familial relationship . . . . We do not believe this impact is
present in this case.”) (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Leroy, 828 N.E.2d at 776 (denying defendant’s argument that he has a fundamental right
to live with his mother within 500 feet of a school).
See Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1343–45 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding that a residency restriction did
not implicate a fundamental right because it did not directly restrict the plaintiff’s actions with his
family); Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 711 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he statute does not directly regulate
the family relationship or prevent any family member from residing with a sex offender in a residence
that is consistent with the statute. We therefore hold that § 692A.2A does not infringe upon a
constitutional liberty interest relating to matters of marriage and family in a fashion that requires
heightened scrutiny.”); Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 405 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Megan’s Law does
not restrict plaintiffs’ freedom of action with respect to their families and therefore does not intrude
upon the aspect of the right to privacy that protects an individual’s independence in making certain
types of important decisions.”).
See, e.g., Miller, 405 F.3d at 711 (applying rational basis scrutiny because the statute did not
absolutely bar living with family, despite evidence of the difficulty of doing so); Seering, 701 N.W.2d
at 664 (“While the residency restriction may impact the Seerings insofar as they cannot choose the
precise location where they can establish their home, it does not absolutely prevent them from living
together.”).
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freely within a state. In Doe v. Miller, the Eighth Circuit recognized that there
may be a right to intrastate travel related to sex offender restrictions but found
it inapplicable in that case.93 Many federal94 and state95 courts recognize a
fundamental right to intrastate travel, but that right has not been found to be
burdened by laws prohibiting sex offenders from entering public spaces. In
Standley v. Town of Woodfin, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
determined that a statute prohibiting sex offenders from entering public parks
did not infringe on the right to intrastate travel.96 The right to intrastate travel
was not burdened because it only protected travel that was necessary for daily
activities, which did not include the use of parks.97 Similarly, the Seventh
Circuit opined that a ban on entrance into public parks did not involve a
fundamental right,98 but that statement was dictum as the court found that the
statute passed even strict scrutiny.99 It is not clear whether the right to travel
freely within a state also includes the right to use and be present in public
places.
In some states, sex offender laws implicate fundamental rights and trigger
heightened scrutiny. There is a wide variety of sex offender regulations, and
some infringe on rights that states recognize as fundamental.

2. Heightened Scrutiny for Fundamental Rights: In States Where a
Fundamental Right is Recognized
When a sex offender restriction implicates a fundamental right, courts
must apply strict scrutiny,100 which requires them to consider empirical
evidence undermining the ostensible relation of the statute to the purpose.
Miller, 405 F.3d at 712–13.
See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 498 (6th Cir. 2002); Lutz v. City of York, 899
F.2d 255, 268 (3d Cir. 1990); Spencer v. Casavilla, 903 F.2d 171, 174 (2d Cir. 1990).
95 See, e.g., Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1161 (Cal. 1995); State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101,
1113 (Fla. 2004); State v. Burnett, 755 N.E.2d 857, 864 (Ohio 2001); Brandmiller v. Arreola, 544
N.W.2d 894, 898 (Wis. 1996).
96 Standley v. Town of Woodfin, 661 S.E.2d 728, 731 (N.C. 2008).
97 Id. See also People v. Pepitone, 106 N.E.3d 984, 989 (Ill. 2008) (stating that there is no fundamental
right to visit a public park).
98 Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 771 (7th Cir. 2004).
99 See id. at 774 (“[E]ven assuming that we ought to consider this ban under the strict scrutiny standard,
we still would hold it was valid as the narrowest reasonable means for the City to advance its
compelling interest of protecting its children from the demonstrable threat of sexual abuse by Mr.
Doe.”).
100 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (explaining fundamental rights protected by
substantive due process).

93
94
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When substantive due process strict scrutiny applies, the state infringement on
the fundamental right must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.101 In Doe v. Department of Public Safety, for example, the Supreme
Court of Alaska applied strict scrutiny and determined that “there is no
compelling interest justifying registration if an offender does not present a
danger to the public.”102 The court did not incorporate empirical evidence into
this decision, but it instead held that the plaintiff had a right to file a civil action
in which he may prove that he does not pose a risk to public safety, including
by expert testimony.103 Although courts have not applied strict scrutiny to sex
offender regulations frequently, when it is applied there is a strong argument
to consider the empirical evidence that shows that the laws are not narrowly
tailored to public safety.

3. Rational Basis Scrutiny
Even if no fundamental right is involved, courts should find that many sex
offender restrictions fail rational basis scrutiny because the empirical data
show that the laws are both unnecessary and ineffective. While rational basis
review requires courts to uphold legislative choices even when they are “based
on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data,”104 there is
no rational basis when empirical data directly contradict legislative
determinations.
Although state and federal courts have generally agreed that sex offender
restrictions have a rational basis even when the scientific consensus
undermines that basis, those decisions rely on epistemological fallacies:105
courts take the McKune quotation106 as unquestionable empirical truth, or they
rely on conclusory statements instead of evidence.
By repeating the McKune Court’s empirical claim, courts have failed to
determine whether sex offender restrictions are “reasonably related to [the]
promotion and protection” of legitimate government interests.107 For example,
101
102
103
104

Id. at 721.

444 P.3d 116, 124, 126, 132 (Alaska 2019).
Id. at 135–36.
Minerva Dairy, Inc. v. Harsdorf, 905 F.3d 1047, 1055 (7th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Minerva
Dairy, Inc. v. Pfaff, 139 S. Ct. 2746 (2019) (citing Monarch Beverage Co. v. Cook, 861 F.3d 678, 683
(7th Cir. 2017)).
105 See supra Part II (examining the courts’ failures to properly account for empirical data).
106 See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34 (2002) (claiming “a frightening and high risk of recidivism”).
107 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735.
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the Illinois Supreme Court determined that a law forbidding sex offenders
from public parks was rationally related to the legitimate government interest
of protecting the public because sex offenders have a high recidivism rate.108 It
explicitly stated that empirical work was irrelevant: “The problem for the
defendant is that, regardless of how convincing that social science may be, ‘the
legislature is in a better position than the judiciary to gather and evaluate data
bearing on complex problems.’”109 The Illinois Court cited McKune and other
cases to support its assertion instead of citing empirical work, ignoring the
requirement that a law have a rational relation to a legitimate state interest.110
The Supreme Court of Iowa,111 the Supreme Court of North Carolina,112 and
the Eighth Circuit113 have also made this mistake. These courts all premised
their conclusions on empirical claims and stated that empirical work is
irrelevant. They argued that there is a rational basis for the laws because they
are necessary to protect the world from sex offenders, who have a high
recidivism rate because the McKune Court said so.
Other federal courts have used conclusory statements to find a rational
basis even when empirical data contradict those statements. Courts have done
little analysis of whether the means are rationally related to the legitimate
interest. In Doe v. Moore, the Eleventh Circuit conflated the step asking
whether there was a legitimate state interest with the step asking whether the
means were rationally related to that interest: “We agree with the state that the
Sex Offender Act meets the rational basis standard. It has long been in the
interest of government to protect its citizens from criminal activity and we find
no exceptional circumstances in this case to invalidate the law.”114 The
Eleventh Circuit is not alone here. Courts have repeatedly failed to apply any
People v. Pepitone, 106 N.E.3d 984, 992, 994–95 (Ill. 2018).
Id. at 992–93 (quoting People v. Minnis, 67 N.E.3d 272, 289 (Ill. 2016)).
Id. at 992, 994–95.
See State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 665 (Iowa 2005) (finding the standard for rational basis met
because, “[a]s numerous authorities have acknowledged, ‘[t]he risk of recidivism posed by sex
offenders is “frightening and high.”’”) (quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103).
112 See Standley v. Town of Woodfin, 661 S.E.2d 728, 731 (N.C. 2008) (citing Conn. Dep’t of Pub.
Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) and McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002) to support the claim that
the public needs to be protected from sex offenders).
113 See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 714–15 (8th Cir. 2005) (“There can be no doubt of a legislature’s
rationality in believing that ‘[s]ex offenders are a serious threat in this Nation,’ and that ‘[w]hen
convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to
be re-arrested for a new rape or sexual assault.’”) (alterations in original) (quoting Conn. Dep’t of
Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 4).
114 410 F.3d 1337, 1345 (11th Cir. 2005).

108
109
110
111
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analysis to the question of rational relation and simply concluded that there is
a rational relation. For example, the Eighth Circuit stated its belief that a
residency restriction was rationally related to public safety without any
explanation or support: “[W]e believe that a residency restriction designed to
reduce proximity between the most dangerous offenders and locations
frequented by children is within the range of rational policy options available
to a state legislature charged with protecting the health and welfare of its
citizens.”115
In the few existing examples where courts apply rational basis with any
scrutiny of the selected means at all, they strike down sex offender regulations
as contrary to the evidence. In In re Taylor, the Supreme Court of California
struck down a residency restriction statute under the due process clause of the
United States Constitution.116 The court relied on the trial court’s findings of
fact to conclude that the blanket enforcement of sex offender residency
restrictions was not rationally related to public safety.117 The trial court heard
testimony and determined that only 2.9% of the multifamily rental housing in
the county complied with the residency restrictions and that even less of that
housing was available for rent.118 It also found that application of the residency
retractions hindered sex offender treatment and caused homelessness.119 The
Supreme Court of California determined that the regulation was not rationally
related to the legitimate state interest in public safety because “[t]he increased
incidence of homelessness has in turn hampered the surveillance and
supervision of such parolees, thereby thwarting the legitimate governmental
objective behind the registration statute (§ 290) to which the residency
restrictions attach; that of protecting the public from sex offenders.”120
This finding was based on an analysis of empirical work. The evidence
that the Supreme Court of California relied on included a report from the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and testimony by the

115 Weems v. Little Rock Police Dep’t, 453 F.3d 1010, 1015 (8th Cir. 2006). See also Gunderson v.

116
117
118
119
120

Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 643–44 (8th Cir. 2003) (explaining the legislative purpose and stating that the
means are reasonably related to that purpose); Doe v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 501
(6th Cir. 2007) (stating that the court was “constrained to conclude that the rationale articulated in
the statute itself satisfies the rational-basis standard” without any explanation).
343 P.3d 867, 878, 882 (Cal. 2015).
Id. at 880–82.
Id. at 873.
Id. at 877.
Id. at 881.
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Director of the San Diego County Department of Housing and Community
Development, a detective, a parole agent, a psychotherapist, and a social
worker—all of whom had professional experience with registered sex
offenders.121 The Taylor court did not strike down all residency restrictions
but determined that they could only be applied when “based on, and
supported by, the particularized circumstances of each individual parolee.”122
If the evidence in the record shows that the challenged regulation is contrary
to the legitimate state interest, a court must find that there is no rational basis.123
Without such evidence, a court may decline to examine any introduced on
appeal and uphold the statute by default.124
Courts currently find that there is a rational basis for any law that the
legislature claims is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose, but they
should take a more critical approach. When all the available evidence shows
that residency restrictions, for example, harm public safety, courts must find
that there is no rational basis for a residency restriction. Refusing to examine
the evidence inevitably leads to upholding statutes that violate due process.

C. Impermissible Irrebuttable Presumption
In addition to the procedural and substantive components, due process
also forbids laws that establish irrebuttable presumptions that are not
universally true.125 There is a strong argument under irrebuttable presumption
doctrine to introduce empirical evidence, but the doctrine is not alive on the

121 Id. at 873–81.
122 Id. at 882.
123 Id. at 869. See also State v. Dykes, 744 S.E.2d 505, 510 (S.C. 2013) (“The complete absence of any
opportunity for judicial review to assess a risk of re-offending, which is beyond the norm of Jessica’s
law, is arbitrary and cannot be deemed rationally related to the legislature’s stated purpose of
protecting the public from those with a high risk of re-offending.”).
124 See, e.g., People v. Avila-Briones, 49 N.E.3d 428, 451 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (“Unlike Taylor, this case
does not involve detailed factual findings showing that Illinois’s sex offender laws undermine the very
goal that they were designed to serve . . . . Based solely on the record before us, we cannot say that
the laws at issue here are an irrational means to protect the public from sex offenders.”).
125 See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973) (“[I]t is forbidden by the Due Process Clause to deny
an individual the resident rates on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of
nonresidence, when that presumption is not necessarily or universally true, in fact, and when the
State has reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination.”); Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. V. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 648 (1974) (“While the regulations no doubt represent a good-faith
attempt to achieve a laudable goal, they cannot pass muster under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, because they employ irrebuttable presumptions that unduly penalize a
female teacher for deciding to bear a child.”).
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federal level.126 Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur127 demonstrates the
applicability of this doctrine to sex offender regulations. The defendant school
board established a policy that pregnant teachers must take maternity leave
because it believed that they were physically incapable of work. The Court
found a due process violation because “[t]he rules contain an irrebuttable
presumption of physical incompetency, and that presumption applies even
when the medical evidence as to an individual woman’s physical status might
be wholly to the contrary.”128 Although there was a legitimate state interest in
requiring those who needed maternity leave to take it, pregnant teachers had
a due process right to rebut the presumption that they could not work.129
Similarly, even if there is a state interest in requiring dangerous offenders to
register and follow other restrictions, sex offenders have a due process right to
demonstrate by the use of evidence that they do not fall into the category of
dangerous offenders that the laws are meant to regulate.
Pennsylvania has recognized that the proscription on irrebuttable
presumptions applies to sex offender laws under the state due process clause.
In In re J.B. the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that automatic registration
requirements for all juveniles adjudicated delinquent in regard to certain
sexual offenses relied on an impermissible irrebuttable presumption that
juvenile sex offenders were highly likely to recidivate.130 The irrebuttable
presumption was impermissible because “that presumption [was] not
universally true and a reasonable alternative means currently exist[ed] for
determining which juvenile offenders are likely to reoffend.”131 The court
relied on empirical work to show that the presumption was not universally
true: it cited a law journal article discussing the data, an empirical report by the
Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Judges’ Commission, and the trial court opinion

126 See Schanuel v. Anderson, 708 F.2d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he continuing validity of the

127
128
129
130
131

[irrebuttable presumption] doctrine has been questioned repeatedly . . . . The irrebuttable
presumption doctrine has been discredited because it is unworkable regardless of the interest which
might have invoked it. We decline to revive the doctrine in this case and accordingly reject Schanuel’s
first due process argument.”); Deborah Dinner, Recovering the Lafleur Doctrine, 22 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 343, 387–88 (2010) (describing irrebuttable presumption doctrine as widely criticized and
no longer followed).
414 U.S. 632.
Id. at 644.
Id. at 647.
107 A.3d 1, 14 (Pa. 2014).
Id.
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citing other studies.132 The court prescribed an individualized risk assessment
as the alternative means.133 Because empirical work showed that juveniles were
not necessarily a recidivism risk, they were entitled to a factual assessment of
the need for the restrictions.134
In 2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court began to apply its reasoning in
In re J.B. to adult cases. In Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, the court decided
that the adult sex offender laws violate irrebuttable presumption doctrine if
recidivism rates are low and if tier-based registration systems are ineffective.135
The court, however, remanded the case for a hearing to allow the parties to
offer evidence and argument regarding whether scientific data sufficiently
undermine the legislature’s findings.136 Striking down the statute would only
be appropriate after fully hearing the scientific evidence.137 In this way, the
court struck a balance: it maintained deference to the legislature while
declaring “this Court will not turn a blind eye to the development of scientific
research, especially where such evidence would demonstrate infringement of
constitutional rights.”138
Other jurisdictions have also shown that there may be room for a similar
irrebuttable presumption challenge. For example, the Northern District of
New York held that a provision of the Adam Walsh Act subjecting certain
offenders to detention and electronic monitoring without a hearing on whether

132 Id. at 17–18.
133 Id. at 19.
134 See also Doe v. Police Comm’r of Bos., 951 N.E.2d 337, 343 (Mass. 2011) (striking down an

135

136
137
138

irrebuttable presumption that those convicted of a level-three sex offense are a danger to other rest
home residents and must be barred from residing in rest homes). But see Doe #1 v. Marshall, No.
2:15-CV-606-WKW, 2018 WL 1321034, at *9 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 14, 2018) (finding that CDPS
precludes consideration of irrebuttable presumption doctrine).
232 A.3d 567, 596 (Pa. 2020). See also Taylor v. Pa. State Police of Pa., 132 A.3d 590, 606–07 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2016) (relying on studies showing that sex offenders have very low recidivism rates to
conclude that the presumption that they are a danger is not universally true for irrebuttable
presumption purposes); Huu Cao v. Pa. State Police, No. 512 M.D. 2015, 2019 WL 5208898, at *9
(Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 16, 2019) (“Mr. Cao has stated [a claim] . . . that SORNA II’s irrebuttable
presumption violates procedural due process.”). But see State v. Martin, 51 N.E.3d 537 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2016) (“The juveniles at issue in J.B. were adjudicated delinquent of certain sexually oriented
offenses, were automatically classified as Tier III sex offenders, and became subject to a lifetime
registration under Pennsylvania’s SORNA. The juveniles were not convicted of a sexually oriented
offense in adult court, as Martin was here.”) (citations omitted).
232 A.3d at 595 n.22.
See id. (remanding to allow parties to proffer evidence and argument regarding the scientific
evidence).
Id. at 596.

544

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23:2

such conditions were necessary violated the United States Constitution’s
restriction on irrebuttable presumptions.139 Such a holding opens a broad
opportunity to show that sex offender post release laws are unconstitutional:
any time that a statute presumes that a person convicted of a sex offense will
be a danger to the public, that person has a right to show there is no such risk
before any post release laws apply. People who are convicted of sexual
offenses but can demonstrate that they pose no real threat to society—like
teachers whose pregnancy will not interfere with their teaching ability—should
be exempt from post-release regulations under irrebuttable presumption
doctrine.
CONCLUSION
As a politically unpopular group, sex offenders are unlikely to have
legislatures change the laws for their benefit. In fact, as the proposed New
York public transportation ban and other recent statutes show, restrictions are
becoming more severe despite the evidence that they are ineffective. It is a
mistake to seek change only through the legislature. Due process, under both
the United States Constitution and state constitutions, forbids these
procedurally deficient and irrational laws. While courts say that they are
leaving the work of interpreting the science to the legislatures, they also rely
on empirical claims in their reasoning. A claim that residency restrictions are
rationally related to public safety is an empirical question that can only be
answered by observation of the external world. Judges cannot deduce the
answer from their chambers.
Policies and treatments that prevent recidivism are available, and states
could use them to provide real protection to the public.140 Washington State,
for example, has not implemented the provisions of the Adam Walsh Act that
condition registration requirements on conviction charges, instead relying on
evidence-based risk assessments to determine who must register.141 In 2016,
the Washington Sex Offender Policy Board recommended that the state
remain out of compliance with the Adam Walsh Act, giving up federal funds,
139 United States v. Karper, 847 F. Supp. 2d 350, 360 (N.D.N.Y. 2011). See also Dean v. McWherter,
70 F.3d 43, 46 (6th Cir. 1995) (applying irrebuttable presumption doctrine to a sex offender
regulation but finding it did not apply because there was no liberty interest that triggered due process
rights).
140 See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 5, at 285 (describing the success of a prison-based treatment program).
141 Id. at 288–89.
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because implementing it “would be less effective at protecting public safety
than the current process.”142 In most states, however, the existing sex offender
laws fail to protect the public when compared to no action or to an evidencebased alternative. If courts struck these laws down, legislatures might be forced
to find solutions that would prevent future harm. By ignoring the evidence
and upholding ineffective laws, courts are validating statutes that harm both
offenders and future victims.

142 WASH. STATE SEX OFFENDER POL’Y BD., WASHINGTON’S COMPLIANCE

WITH SORNA
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE SEX OFFENDER POLICY BOARD 5 (2016),
https://sgc.wa.gov/sites/default/files/public/sopb/documents/sorna_findings_and_recommendations.
pdf.
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